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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STA TE OF UTAH
CLAUDIA HILL, by and through her
Guardian Ad Litem,
MARY HILL FOG EL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

12082

VS.

ORAND CENTRAL INCORPORAT~JD,
a corporation
Defendant a·nd Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
The appellant, Claudia Hill, has appealed from the
decision of the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge,
Recond J ndicial District Court, granting a summary
judgment in favor of the respondent, Grand Central, Inc.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant brought the instant action against
her former employer, the respondent, claiming defamation of her characteT in the manner in which she was
1
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discharged from employment. The trial court granted
judgment in favor of the respondent upon the grounds
that the case is one of conditional privilege, that there
is no evidence of actual malice on the part of respondent
to remove the said privilege, that there, is no genuine
issue of a material fact remaining to be tried, and therefore, respondent is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was employed by the respondent as
a cashier on November 6, 1969, and discharged on December 21, 1969. The appellant was presented with a
Utah State Department of Employment Separation Notice indicating she was being discharged for ''misconduct" because of "excessive shortages in the register in
which she worked." (R-1)
The separation notice was filled out by one Ellen
Fitzpatr,ick at the request of the respondent's store
manager, John Davis. The notice was then given to
Frank Adams for delivery to the appellant. All of the
aforementioned individuals were employees of the respondent. (R-6-A)
The respondent in answe,r to appellant's interrogatories stated that those cash registers, at which appellant worked, consistently checked out short on the days
she worked them and that such shortages were considered too frequent and too consistent to justify her further employment. (R-6-A)
2
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Following her discharge, the appellant filed a complaint against the respondent alleging that the separation notice was libelous on its face and had excessive
publication.
Tht> respondPnt filed a motion to dismiss upon the
grnunds that appellant had failed to state a cause of
action against the appellant upon which relief could be
granted in that the matter was one of conditioned privilege and there was no malice or the existence of any
evidence thereof. The trial court held that inasmuch as
the complaint did allege malice, a cause of action had
been stated. However, the trial court questioned the
aviwllant as to the evidence of actual malice. Upon the
failure of appellant to show any such evidence, the court
granted her 30 days from February 5, 1970 to produce
some evidence, by discovery or otherwise, of actual
malice.
Appellant submitted one set of interrogatories during this period of time which was promptly answered
by the respondent. Respondent did not move for summary judgment until April 3, 1970, thereby allowing
a1ipellant additional time to produce such evidence. No
further discovery was utilized.
Respondent movPd for a summary judgment on
April 3, 1970, at which time the appellant's claimed evidence of actual maliee ,,,as reviewed. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent
111ion the grounds that the matter is one of conditional
privilege, and there being no evidence of actual malice
to remove the said privilege, there is no genuine issue

1
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of a material fact to be tried, and respondent is, thcref ore, entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT.
It is well established in this jurisdiction, and the
weight of authority generally, that an employer has a
right to protect it's interests and, in so doing, to communicate with and carry out protective measures through
its own employees. In such matters an employer has a
conditional privilege.

In Combes vs. JJ!lontgoniery Ward & Co., 119 Ut 407,
228 P 2d 272 (1951) this court cited with approval Harris
vs. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172, 43 S.E. 594, for the rule that:
. . . Any communication between employer and
employee is protected by this privilege, provided
that it is made bona fide about something in
which (1) speaker or writer has an interest or
duty; (2) the hearer or person addressed had a
corresponding interest or duty; and provided ( 3)
the statement is made in protection of that interest or in the furtherance of that duty. Tlwrt>
must be also an honest belief in the tn1th of the
statement. Where these facts are found to exist,
the communication is protected by law, unless
the plaintiff can show malice on the defendant's
part; the burden in this respect being upon the
plaintiff.
4
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'l1he substance of the aforementioned rule was said to
be statutorily recognized by Sec. 103-38-8, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943 (now 76-40-8 Utah Code Annotated
1953) which provides that:
A communication made to person interested in
the communication by one who is also interested,
or who stands in such relation to the former as
to afford the reasonable ground for supposing
his motive innocent, is not presumed to be malicious, and is a privileged comm1mication.
Also similar is Sec. 45-2-3, Utah Code Annotated
1953. These two statutes deal with criminal libel and
newspapers, respectively.
In Knight vs. Patterson, 20 Ut. 2d 242, 436 P 2d 801
( l 968), where one partner accused the other partner of
('mbezzlement before a third party who had loaned the
partnership money, this court affirmed the trial court's
granting of a summary judgment upon the grounds that
the statement was in the area of conditional privilege,
and that "they were thus all involved together in a business transaction."
In Svielberg vs. Kuhn Brothers, et al., 39 Ut. 276,
116 P 1027 (1911), where one businessman wrote to
another bnsisessman accusing a mutual employee of
"blackmail" and "selling company products and approJ>riating the money to his own use," the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's verdict in favor of the
defendant, holding that the evidence was sufficient to
Rlio\v that the communication was qualifiedly or conditionally privileged. Both businesses had

5
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. . . a common interest in the subject matters
concm'lling which the communications were carried on between them, and that they sustained
such a relation toward each other in tlrn premises
as to make it reasonably proper for one to giv(,
to the other information concerning the conduct
in the dealings of the plaintiff . . .
In the' case at bar, there is no question but that
a. conditional privilege existed in behalf of the respondent to protect its property and to communicate with
those individuals who have a common interest - in
this case employees, to assure such protection. The respondent employer had every reason to take the precautionary measures it did inasmuch as there were consistent
and excessive· shortages at those· particular cash registers
worked by the appellant.
The appellant contends there was excessive publication of the separation notice. However, the respondent,
being a corporation, must deal through its employees. In
this cas.e the manager of the respondent's store instructed
his secretary to fill out the separation notice which was
then given to one other employee for delivery to the
appellant.
In 33 Am.Jr., Libel and Slander, Section 189, we
read:
It is a rule recognized by many authorities that
a privilege is not lost so long as the occasion is
used in a reasonable manner and in the ordinary
course of business. Applying this rule, it has been
held that the· privilege is not lost by rraso11 of

the passing of the defamatory matter in the usual
course of business through the liainds of ste11or1-

6
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raphers rt<11d clerks whether in the employ of the
writer or of the addressee. For example, it has
beBn held that the privilege attaching to a letter
written to a firm on a privileged occasion containing statements defamatory of a third person
made with ont expressed malice is not lost because the writer knows that it will probably be as
it was in fact first opened and read by a clerk....
(emphasis added)

rrhe appellant contends that the acts of the respondent were done wantonly and maliciously in that the
:-:eparation notice gave "misconduct" as the reason for
discharge. It is claimed, therefore, that the conditional
privilege was removed.
In Cornbes vs. 1llontgo11iery Ward & Co., supra,
a case nearly identical to the case at bar, this court
examined the question of malice after it had already
Pstablished conditional privilege'. In that case, the employer's investigator questioned two employees concerning certain missing money and the "honesty" of a
third employee, Mr. Combes, who later the same day
was fired. Combes based his complaint for slander upon
the communication of the company's investigator with
the other two employees. This court held there was conditional privile:ge and no evidence of actual malice, and
affirmed the trial courFs directed verdict in favor of
the employer. In discussing malice, this court distingnished between "implied malice" and "actual malice"
eoncluding that only actual malice overcomes and destroys the privilege. This court stated:

It should be horne in mind that there is a distinction between the malice which is implied from
7
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every defamatory publication and the actual
malice which is necessary to remove a conditional
privilege, the privjleged communication being an
exception to the nile that every such defamatory
publication implies malice; National Standard
Life Ins. Co. vs. Bil.lZ.ngton, Tex. Cjv. App. 89,
S.W. 2d 491 at page 403, states a definition of
this type of malice ,:.;hich has been used and
approved by numerous courts:
This kind of malice . . . which overcomes
and destroys the privilege, is, of course, quite
distinct from that which the law, in the first
instance, imputes with respect to every defamatory charge, irrespective of rnotfre. It
has been defined to be an indirect and wiekt>d
motive which induces the defendant to defame the plaintiff.
Where thr condition(t1 pri1.:ilege exists, tlie defe11rlant is protected wnless plaintiff pleads and proue s
facts u·hich indicate actual malice i'n that thf utterances were made from spite, ill will or hatred toiuard him and, unless the pla.intiff produces suc71
evidence, there is no issue to be submitted to the
jury. (Emphasis added)

This court defined actual malice as that malice which
has a "·wicked motive" and upon which utterances are
made from "spite, ill will or hatred."
This court in Combes, supra concluded that the
record failed to show any evidence of actual malice and,
in fact, the:
. . . investigation was carried on in a brn.,int>sslike and courteous manner, without any undue notice being given to it. rrhere were no outright
accusations of theft or dishonesty, and no threat
nor any unnecessary unpleasantness. r:Che whole

8
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examination into the disappearance of the money
in that department and the suspicion as to the
plaintiff seemed to be a bona fide inquiry about
the facts and circumstances. It was prope1rly limited to those persons who would be closely concerned with the transaction and the questions did
not go beyond what was reasonably necessary and
appropriate to the investigation.

It follows that the trial court did not err in
holding that there was no showing of malice so
as to make a question for submission to the jury.
In the instant case the appellant's complaint alleged
that the information contained in the separation notice
was not true and that by issuing said notice, discharging
the appellant for ''misconduct,'' the respondent had acted maliciously. However, the said notice explained "misconduct'' as ''excessive shortages in the registers in
which she worked." Furthermore, respondent's answers
to interrogatories clearly show it had every reason to
believe that the information stated on the separation
notice was correct. The appelant has produced no evidence to the contrary.
The State of Utah requires an employer to issue a
separation notice to each departing employee and the
respondent, in this regard, was required to prepare the
said separation notice honestly and accurately. As to
respondent's choice of the word "misconduct," such is
not evidentiary of malice. In Woolston vs. 111ontana Free
Press, 2 P 2d 1020 (l\Iontana 1931) where one accused
another of being "unethical" and "underhanded" the
court in sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's
complaint, stated:
9
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It is well settled law that the words used in thP
alleged libelious article must be susceptible of
but one meaning to constitute libel per se ...

Both 'unethical' and 'underhand' are words of
such broad meaning that the,\· may or ma_\" not
carry a libelous meaning.
The trial court in the instant case correctly acknowledged that the "words used in the separation notice are
as capable of allegations of neglect or incompetency as
they are of theft."
The trial court applied the rule set out in the Combes
case and as the pleadings failed to indicate actions by
the respondent of actual malice it granted the appellant
time in which to produce some such evidence. This, the
appellant failed to do. It follows that the trial court
did not err in holding there was no showing of actual
malice. As stated in the Combes case, quoting with
approval from Newell, Slander am.d Libel at page 1111:
The ji"ry, however, will be the proper trilmnal
to determine the question of express malice irherc
evidence of ill will is fortlzcomin9; but if, takP11
in connection with adniitted facts, the u·ords complnined of are sitch as nmst Jun:c been 11sfd lio11estly mid in good faith by the defendant. the judg(',
may withdraw the case froni a .fitry, and direct
ct verdict for the defendant. See also "ATewell,
Slander and Libel, 4th ed. Sec. 395. (Emphasis
added.)
As a result of appellant's failure or inability to
produce such evidence of actual malice, there was no
material issue remaining to be tried and therefore, the
trial court did not err in granting respondent's motion
for summary judgment.

10
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POINT II.
APPELLANT \VAS GRANTED SU F FI CIENT TIME IN WHICH TO PRODUCE
EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE..
The appellant claims she did not have adequate time
to produce evidence of actual malice. However, the trial
court did not require that appellant prove actual malice
but only that she produce some evidence of actual malice
that could form an authentic issue of a material fact.
Upon the failure of the appellant to produce any such
evi<lence, the trial court granted appellant thirty days
from February 5, 1970, to produce merely some evidence
of actual malice. The appellant served one set of interrogatories upon the respondent on February 26, 1970,
20 days after being granted 30 days time to produce.
The respondent answered these interrogatories and
served the same five days later. The appellant did not
object to any part of respondent's answers, nor did
appellant move for any order to compel answers if she
felt the same were insufficient.
On April 3, 1970 respondent's motion for summary
judgment was heard and granted. Therefore, appellant
had 56 days in which to merely show the existence of
some evidence of actual malice.
The trial court stated in its Bench Ruling On Motion For Summary Judgment:
As far as I know there has been no other effort
to take depositions or anything else. It would
appear to the court that the plaintiff does not
have - has been given a reasonable amount of

11
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time to produce evidence or show that hl' has
some and has not done so. The action seems to
be one of harassment. The motion to dismiss is
granted. (R-16).
The responsibility of an opposing party upon a motion for summary jndg1nent is well stated in Dupler vs.
Yates, 10 Ut. 2d 251, 351 P 2d 624 (1960) wherein this
court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary
judgment upon the grounds that no genuine issue of
material fact was raised. This court there stated:
Upon a motion for summary jndgment, tlw conrts
ought tu recognize, as a minimum, that the opposing party produce some evidentiary matter in eontradiction of the movant's case or specify in an
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so.
Where, as in the instant case, the materials pn'sented by the moving party are sufficient to
entitle him to a directed verdict and the opposing
party fails either to offer counteraffidavits or
other materials that raise a credible issue or to
show that he has evidence not then ayailahle,
summary judgment may be rendered for the moving party.
The record made by the defendant, in support
of his motion for summary judgment, controverted the unverified allegations in the plaintiffs'
amended complaint and therefore, in tlw ahs(•nce
of counteraffidavits, no genuine issues of material
fact were created.
In the case at bar, the appellant had adequate 6me
in which to produce some evidence of actual malice and
upon her failure to do so the summary judgent was
well taken and should be affirmed.

12
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Upon the failure of the appellant to produce any
evidence to support its claim of actual malice, to remove
the respondent's conditional privilege, no issue of any
material fact remained and the respondent was entitled,
therefore, to the summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that as an employer, it was conditionally privileged in its relationship
with the appellant which privilege could be removed
ony by actual malice on its part. The appellant was
given every reasonable opportunity by the trial court to
produce some evidence of actual malice but failed to
do so. If such evidence did, indeed, exist, the same
could have been produced by affidavit, deposition, or
request for admissions. The appellant sought only
answers to interrogatories which merely proved the
honest intent of the respondent.
The judgment of the Second District Court from
which this cause arises must be affirmed.
HANSON, BALH\VIN
BRANDT & W ADS\VORTH
REX J. HANSON
LEONARD H. RUSSON
Attorneys for Defendant
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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